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cou
for post-conviction relief.

In November

11, Corporal

ins of the Idaho

a two

was dispatched to
head-on

d

Twitchell, was killed in the accident.

The

one

vehicles, Jory

.) The driver of the other vehicle, Marc

Klein, was transported to an area hospital.
revealed a

Police

1-2.) Blood drawn from Klein

of .279. (Exhibit J7.)
state charged

Klein

with

and

felony vehicular

misdemeanor driving under the influence (excessive).

(Exhibit J9.) The Idaho

State Police completed two accident reconstruction reports

one by Cpl. Allen W.

Bivins, which was approved by Cpl. Fred Rice, and a second by Cpl. Rice
himself.

(Plaintiff's exhibits 2, 3.)

Both Bivins and Rice concluded that the

accident occurred when Klein crossed into Twitchell's lane of travel. (!d.)

1 The Idaho Supreme Court granted Klein's motion to augment the record with
documents from the underlying criminal case (exhibits J1 - J18). (10/11/13
Order.) These documents were also admitted as exhibits in the post-conviction
case. (R., Vol. II, pp.201-203.)

1

11 .)

a

P.3d 727

conviction
conclud

that Cpl.
he

testimony at
was

g

in

case, and that he should therefore be permitted to withdraw his plea. (Exhibit

J 13.)

The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the

motion because Klein's conviction had already become final. (Exhibits J 16, J 17);
also State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 354-356, 79 P.3d 711, 71

15 (2013)

(holding that where a defendant does not appeal a judgment of conviction, the
district court's jurisdiction to set aside the conviction ends 42 days after the
defendant is sentenced).

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (holding that there are no
constitutional barriers to prevent a judge from accepting a guilty plea from a
defendant who chooses not to admit factual guilt).
2

2

a

, Vol. I,
(1 )

d

a

impeachment evidence
Klein's

=':"::::=-.:::...L

cred

violation by
reliabiiity

.1

)
to
Cpl.

counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file a motion to

his guiity plea; and (3)

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

conduct an independent investigation of the accident or to adequately consult
with an independent accident reconstructionist. (Id.)
The district court summarily dismissed Klein's first and second postconviction claims, but ordered an evidentiary hearing on the third.
pp.204-217.)

Following the evidentiary hearing, at which Klein and his trial

counsel testified,
Vol. II, pp.242-250.)

3

(R, Vol. II,

district court denied K!ein's third claim. (Tr., pp.44-106; R,
timely appealed. (R Vol. II, pp.251-255.)

Brady v. Maryland, 837 U.S. 83 (1963).

3

counsel failed
conduct
uately consult
reconstructionist?

on

an

as:

1.

Has Klein failed to show that the district court erred in summarily
dismissing his Brady post-conviction claim?

2.

Has Klein failed to show that the district court erred in summarily
dismissing his post-conviction claim that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to move to withdraw his plea?

3.

Has Klein failed to show that the district court erred in denying, after an
evidentiary hearing, his post-conviction claim that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to adequately investigate the accident?

4

the district court erred in
post -conviction

state committed a

impeachment

reasons.

.9-15,)

violation by withholding

ibility and reliability

regarding the

(Appellant's brief,

=-'-"::..=:...J-

Klein's

for any of

Cpl.
alternative

any "evidence" regarding the ElIinqton case and pending appeal

in which Cpl. Fred Rice's credibility was challenged constituted at most,
impeachment evidence, which the
Klein.

had no duty to disclose prior to its

Second, Klein has failed

establish prejudice as

result of any lack of disclosure. Third, the Custer County prosecutor's office did
not have the duty to disclose the challenges to CpL Rice's credibility in the
Ellington case and pending appeal because such information was not in its
control prior to Klein's guilty plea.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file .... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518,523, 164 P.3d 798,803
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76,80,57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).

5

(2003)

1,

a claim
evidence
eiement of
1

I.C. § 1

164 P.3d 798,
1

at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.

Due process requires the prosecution to disclose to the defense all
exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession. Brady v. Maryland,
837 U.S. 83 (1963).

When there has been a conviction after tria!, a Brady

violation is found if the defendant can show: (1) that the evidence was
exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that the evidence was suppressed by the state;
and (3) materiality (Le. prejudice). State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 380, 247
P.3d 582, 607 (2010) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)).
However, "the United States Constitution does not require the State to
disclose material impeachment information prior to entering a plea agreement
with the defendant" Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 64,105 P.3d 376,390 (2004)
(emphasis added) (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002)). This

6

a

is

p,

, 507 (1 st CiL 201
against the

ice that

teaches that Brady
ensue from

loss of an

opportunity to plea-bargain with complete knowledge of all relevant facts. This
good sense: when a defendant chooses to admit his guilt, Brady concerns
")

1,

The State Is Not Required To Disclose Impeachment Evidence Prior
To Plea Negotiations

Impeachment evidence is that which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e.
uce the effectiveness

his testimony by bringing

evidence which

explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony, State v, Marsh,
141 Idaho 862, 868-869, 119 P3d 637, 643-644 (Ct App. 2004). Exculpatory
evidence relates to a defendant's guilt or innocence. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho
772, 781, 984 P.2d 127, 136 (1997). As discussed above, a state has no duty to
disclose evidence which is merely impeaching, and not exculpatory, prior to a
defendant's guilty plea. Ruiz, 536 U.S, at 629.
In this case, as the district court correctly recognized (R. Vol, II, pp.211213), evidence regarding the challenge to CpL Rice's credibility in the Ellington
case and pending appeal constituted, at most, impeachment evidence.

The

challenge to Cpl. Rice's credibility did not constitute exculpatory evidence
because it did not relate to Klein's guilt or factual innocence to the felony

7

only

it

1
we

")

first time on

are
, even if

any

is

ing

is Court

standing for the

a

to

potential impeachment evidence prior to a defendant's entry of an Alford plea. To
the contrary, the distinction drawn in Ruiz regarding when a state has a duty to
disclose material impeachment evidence was not based upon the nature of the
guilty plea, but upon whether a plea agreement has been reached, i.e. whether
there was a trial. See Ruiz, 536 U

at 623 (concluding "that the Constitution

does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence

prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendanf' (emphasis added)).
As discussed above, this is because impeachment evidence "is special in relation
to the fairness of a trial not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary" DunlaQ,
141 Idaho at 64,106 P3d at 390 (emphasis in original) (quoting Ruiz, 536 U.S. at
629). A defendant who enters an Alford plea waives the right to a trial, the

8

to a

Court opinions

also

566 U.S.
(2012),

counsel to

Sixth

of

negotiations, narrowed the holding of
cou

because "the right to

would be rendered
upon a "full understanding of

counsel's
prosecutor's case,"
p.14.)

including

the

performance of trial counsel with regard to plea negotiations may now be
evaluated by the courts under the Sixth Amendment, it does not follow that
counsel must therefore be entitled to the disclosure of potential impeachment
evidence that they were not entitled to before. Pursuant to

~

and Lafler, the

effectiveness of counsel's performance during plea negotiations may simply be
evaluated based on the circumstances and the information actually available to
counsel at the time.
As in Ruiz, Klein's guilty plea precludes a Brady challenge based on
impeachment evidence.

Because evidence regarding the challenge to Cpl.

Rice's credibility in Ellington was not exculpatory, but was merely impeaching, the
state did not have a duty to disclose it prior to entering into a plea agreement with

9

2

was not

awareness
is

going

144

415,41

P.3d

797 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428,436,885 P.2d 1144,
1152 (Ct. App. 1994).

In making this determination, the court will "employ an

objective assessment, based in part on the persuasiveness of the withheld
information as to whether the particular defendant and his counsel would have
insisted on going to triaL" Roeder, 144 Idaho at 418-419, 162 P.3d at 797-798.
The court will not consider a defendant's subjective statements that he would not
have pled guilty had he known of the information.

~

at 419, 162 P.3d at 798.

The court must also consider any objective motivations a defendant may have
had for pleading guilty. Gardner, 126 Idaho at 436-437,885 P.2d at 1152-1153.
"Any

derived by the defendant from

10

guilty plea is a significant factor

as a

Klein's
he has
has failed to show that but for the

failure

in his position would

, that a reasonable
to

(R., Vol. II, p.210), any

direct court correctly
to Cpi.

In

would

simply not to

to Klein at a potential trial. The
or his

'=':":':.:..c...;;;L.=-:"':'

The

little use
Cpl. Rice

possessed the separate

completed by Cpl. Bivins, which also found that Klein caused the accident by
passing into Twichell's lane of travel. (Petitioner's exhibit 3.)
Further, it is clear that Klein received the benefit of a favorable plea
bargain. In exchange for Klein's guilty plea to felony vehicular manslaughter, the
state agreed to dismiss an excessive driving under the influence charge, and to
recommend that the district court impose a six-year unified sentence with three
years fixed. (See R., Vol. II, p.205.) As Klein's counsel testified at the evidentiary
hearing, at the time Klein decided to plead guilty, he was "tired of being in [the)
Custer County Jail, and "wanted to get on with things." (Tr., p.74, Ls.2-5.) Klein
testified that at the time, he felt the plea agreement was fair. (Tr., p.93, L.23 p.94, L.2.) Though Klein may have been unhappy with the lengthier sentence

11

J 1),

is case.
case was

drawn from

good

3,

id

an

on

in

as

own

the area of impact. (ld.) Following the accident, Klein told investigating officers
that

was "fucked" and that he "really screwed up this time." (Id., p.8.) Klein

also asked a bystander at the scene of the accident if he was the person he had
hit. (Id., p.g.)
Even if the district court erred in conclud
disclose

that

state had no duty to

challenge to Cpl. Rice's credibility in the Ellington case prior to the

entry of Klein's guilty plea, Klein has still failed to show that the district court erred
in summarily dismissing
to show

ice from

post-conviction petition claim, because
iack of disclosure.

12

has failed

3.

or
in
S. 419, 437 (1

case,

Thus, to prevail,

was possessed by a district's

m

and prosecutorial personnel."
285 F.3d 1

1, 1309 (11 th Cir. 2002) (internal q
F.3d 15, 20 (1 51 Cir.

eXCUlpatory material "possessed by

d

prosecution

to disclose does not extend to "other government
in

extends to

or

agents").
that have no

investigation or prosecution at issue."

399 F.3d 197, 216 (3 rd Cir. 2005) {internal quotations
At the time of Klein's guilty plea, there had been no judicial determination
that Cpl. Rice testified falsely at Ellington's trial. In denying Ellington's motion for
a new trial approximately a year and a half before Klein was arrested, the
Kootenai County district court expressed "some concern" about Cpl. Rice's
integrity, but acknowledged that it was "difficult to conclude that [Cpl. Rice]
intentionally or carelessly attempted to mislead the Ellington jury."

(R., Vol. I,

p.43.) It also found that the defense merely "pointed out a valid basis upon why
they might be able to impeach the testimony of Rice." (Id.) The state disputed
Ellington's allegation that Cpl. Rice testified inconsistently or dishonestly at
Ellington's trial.

(See Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727.) Therefore, the

"evidence" Klein asserts the state should have been disclosed essentially

13

n

4
=~;..;;;..;c.;.case

ing

as it was

was just as

Custer County
of

had no duty
in

=.:.;.;~~

case.

Klein has failed to show that the state committed a Brady violation in
failing to inform him of the challenge to CpL Rice's credibility in the

case

pending appeal. The state is not required to disclose impeachment evidence
prior to entering into a plea agreement with a defendant, Klein was not prejudiced
by any lack of disclosure, and the existence of the pending Ellington appeal was
not evidence "possessed by or known to" the Custer County prosecutor's office
or its agents. For any and each any of these alternative reasons, Klein has failed
to show that the district court

in summarily dismissing this

Neither
Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in
nor
Kootenai County
district court's memorandum decision denying Ellington's motion for a new trial
either testifying at any hearing on Ellington's
made any reference to Cpl.
motion for a new trial, or being otherwise involved in the post-trial proceedings in
that case. See Ellington, 151 Idaho 53,253 P.3d 727; (R., Vol. I, pp.32-46.)
4

14

II.

that

district court
his

move

raw
to allege a

in

counsel was ineffective for failing to timely

(Appellant's brief, pp.15-18.)

However,

ulne issue of material fact that either his counsei's

performance was deficient, or that he was prejudiced by any deficiency.
failed
d

has

Klein

establish that the district court erred in summarily

this claim.

8.

"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file .... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76,80,57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).

C.

Klein Failed To Allege A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That His Counsel
Was Ineffective With Regard To His Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must

demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,
137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). An attorney's performance is not constitutionally

15

1,

1

~=::::.,1

To
'U,,",n"')O

of the

761, 760 P.2d 11

11

1,

1

1999). Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do
make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel.

Roman v.

State, 125 Idaho 644, 649, 873 P.2d 898, 903 (Ct. App. 1994).
In a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to pursue
a motion in the underlying criminal action, the district court may consider
probability of success of the motion in question in determining whether
attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent performance. Boman v. State, 129
Idaho 520,526,927 P.2d 91

916 (Ct. App. 1996). Where the alleged deficiency

is counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued,
would not have been granted by the trial court, is generally determinative of both
prongs of the Strickland test.

lsi

16

is

1

713-71

which the Idaho
Ellington's

Court concluded that

, was published on May 27, 2011

counsel was
Klein's guilty
in the seven days
and the
Klein's judgment

in
falsely
Klein contends that his
a motion to

raw

idaho Supreme Court's conclusions in

=~:.:::..:..:.

business days) between the publication of the

=.:..;~=-:...:

ineffective for
on

of the district court's jurisdiction to set aside or amend
(Appellant's brief,

15-18.) As the district court correctly

determined (R VoL, II, pp.214-215),

to

assistance of counsel. Klein has failed to show either that his trial counsel was
deficient, or that he was prejudiced by any deficiency.
First, Klein cannot satisfy either prong of the Strickland test because he
cannot show a reasonable probability that any timely motion to withdraw a guilty
plea based on the Ellington decision would have been successful. Klein faced a
high burden had he attempted to withdraw his plea following his sentencing.
Generally, a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea will not be granted after
sentencing. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P,2d 281, 284 (1990);
Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. App. 1988). A court
may permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing only upon a
satisfactory showing by the defendant that withdrawal of the guilty plea is

17

o

.v.

plea

1

1

1

the
for many

g
L

reasons

in

First, Klein failed to establish a Brady or other constitutional violation

associated with his plea.

Second, knowledge that the Idaho Supreme Court

concluded CpL Rice testified falsely in another trial would have limited utility for
most, such evidence would constitute impeachment evidence, and
would only be useful to Klein had CpL Rice actually testified at trial. However, as
noted, the state did not have to exclusively rely on CpL Rice's reconstruction
report because a separate report compiled by CpL Bivins also concluded that the
accident was caused when Klein crossed into Twitchell's lane of travel. (Plaintiffs
exhibit 3.) Third, Klein received a favorable plea bargain from
Vol. II, p.205.) It is unlikely that
"manifest injustice" would result

state. (See

trial court in this case would have found
not permitting Klein

18

withdraw his

was

a
id.)
concluded, even if a

as the

probability of success,
that

immediately aware
district court reasoned,

seem un

this

a

new

to fully

on

within seven days

an appellate

days]," and

that opinion in

a

a defense attorney's

.) This is
client

sentenced, no direct appeal is

I

and counsel's

participation in his client's case has essentially concluded.

Klein thus cannot

show that attorneys automatically fall below the Strickland objective standard of
reasonableness where they fail to maintain a weekly review of appellate
decisions, recognize each opinion's potential significance in cases where their
clients have already been sentenced, conduct necessary communication with
their client (or former client) regarding any relevant motions, and compile and
submit relevant motions based on newly-published opinions, all within four
business days.
Klein has failed to show either that his trial counsel was deficient for failing
to file a timely motion to withdraw Klein's guilty based on Ellington within four
business days of that case's publication, or that he was prejudiced by any such

19

d

is

a

is

B.

Standard Of Review
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has

preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on

I.C.

burden of proving, by a
his claim is based.

57(c); Estes v. State, 111 idaho 430,436,725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986). A

court's decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to
great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App.
1990). Where the district court conducts a hearing and enters findings of fact
and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact
they are clearly erroneous, but

if

freely review the conclusions of law drawn by

the district court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971
P.2d

729-730 (1998). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be

20

are

1
r

97,

P.

1

,11 0

C.

As discussed above, it is

established that an appeliate court

attempt to second-guess trial
sions are made upon

not

ic decisions unless those deci-

basis

, ignorance of

vant law, or other shortcomings

of objective evaluation.

1

Idaho at 153-54, 177 P.3d
sufficient to show deprivation

1

assistance
,1

1

P.3d

1,

Strategic choices made after incomplete investigations are reasonable only so far
as reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.

kL

A defendant's lawyer does not always have a duty to consult experts when the
government is proposing to put on expert witnesses.
v. Anderson, 255 F3d 455, 459

(th Cir.

2001).

kL;

see

Miller

("There may be no reason to

question the validity of the government's proposed evidence or the evidence may
be so weak that it can be demolished on cross-examination.")
In this case, the district court correctly concluded that Klein failed to
establish that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate
the accident

(R., Vol. II, pp.242-250.)

Klein does not challenge any of the

district court's factual determinations. (See Appellant's brief, pp.18-27.) Those
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Oleson contacted an accident
to
his
and
opposing expert testimony. VVhile Oleson does not recall whether
they specifically reviewed Rice's findings, they did at least discuss
Rice's credentials and experience. Oleson was essentially advised
that Rice had significant qualifications and experience and that it
would be very difficult to rebut his conclusions. Oleson also had
prior experience with Rice on a prior unrelated matter wherein
Oleson believed that Rice made a very good witness when
testifying before the jury.
At one point, Oleson had a telephone conference with Rice
wherein they discussed [Bivins'] report and Rice's opinions
regarding the accident. In the telephone conference, Oleson raised
the issues and concerns he had when he first became aware of
[Bivins'] conclusions. In Oleson's mind, Rice was able to provide
good explanations as to the conclusions of the officers. Oleson
then discussed with Klein his telephone call with an accident
reconstructionist, the telephone call with Rice, and Oleson's prior
observations of Rice testifying in a trial. Particularly, Oleson related
that it was the opinion of the accident reconstructionist that it would
be very difficult to refute Rice's conclusions. Oleson, however, also
told Klein that based on his experience with expert witnesses, they
still could probably find an expert witness who would be willing to
refute Rice and [Bivins'] conclusions if Klein was willing to pay for it.
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while
witnesses
would
failing to yield. Klein expressed
of the Custer
County jail and felt
defenses. Klein
determined not
a
and to accept the plea
agreement offered
the prosecutor. The
was later
confirmed in a letter from Oleson to
(R., Vol II,
Thus, rather
and to

to investigate

doing
to consult or

as Klein

on appeal

a defense reconstructionist expert,
p.21), Oleson's trial preparation,
whether

including his
reconstructionist to

pursue a defense
was more

rebut

than sufficient and did not fail below the Strickland objective standard of
reasonableness. (R., Vol. II, pp.245-246.)
As the district court found, Klein became familiar with Bivins' and Rice's
accident reconstruction reports and discussed them with Rice himself. (ld.) Klein
evaluated Rice's credibility and reliability through his own personal experiences,
and

upon

consultation

with

a private

reconstructionist.

(Id.)

Oleson

communicated his efforts to Klein, with whom he discussed the decision whether
or not to attempt to locate a defense reconstructionist in light of the strength of
the state's case, Oleson's favorable opinion of Rice, the cost of seeking and
finding a reconstructionist who would testify favorably to Klein, and Klein's
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overcome

respectfu lIy req uests that
denial of Klein's petition for post-conviction
DATED this 27th day of December 2013

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

district court's
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